Exhibit A

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF N	NEW YORK	
UNITED STATES OF AMERI	ICA,	
V .		16-CR-00414 (JSR)
ANDREW CASPERSEN,		
Defenda	ant.	
	x	
		New York, N.Y.
		November 4, 2016 2:00 p.m.
Before:		
	HON. JED S. RA	
		District Judge
	APPEARANCE	S
PREET BHARARA		
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York		
CHRISTINE I. MAGDO Assistant United	States Attorne	У
BRACEWELL, LLP		
Attorneys for Defendant PAUL L. SHECHTMAN		
MARGARET LYNAUGH		

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THE DEPUTY CLERK: Will the parties please identify themselves for the record.

MS. MAGDO: Good afternoon, your Honor. Assistant United States Attorney Christine Magdo on behalf the government. With me at counsel table is Criminal Investigator Kurt Hafer of our office. Good afternoon.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. SHECHTMAN: Good afternoon, your Honor. Paul Shechtman for Mr. Caspersen, and Maggie Lynaugh is with me from my law firm, and obviously Mr. Caspersen is here.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. Please be seated. here for sentencing.

Before we turn to the interesting gambling disorder issue, I think we need to first talk about the quideline calculation. So, the presentence report has the total offense level at 34, the criminal history category at I, and the guideline range at 151 to 188 months.

Both sides seem to agree to that, although each side sort of hints that they have minor disagreements with that. The government seems to suggest that the Court should maybe have a higher guideline range based on loss amount.

MS. MAGDO: No, your Honor, we're not suggesting a higher range. We're just suggesting that in this case, the quidelines actually underestimate the seriousness of the loss amount.

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Okay. And defense counsel has some THE COURT: problems with I think the broker enhancement, broker adjustment.

MR. SHECHTMAN: Again, your Honor, no. It may underscore the fact that some of these enhancements have an arbitrary quality to them, but it certainly fits and applies, and that's why we agreed to it.

THE COURT: Okay. So, I'll adopt the presentence report calculation, total offense level of 34, criminal history category of I, guideline range of 151 to 188 months.

But I want to note at the outset, in case the government wants to comment, that as I indicated at the time of plea, I think the calculation borders on the irrational. First, the great bulk of the calculation comes about from the loss amount. So, the total offense level is 34, 22 points are based on the loss amount. I don't see why loss amount should occupy in this sense, as it does in so many quideline cases, such an inordinate position, overwhelming every other factor.

And I also don't understand what the rational basis was for the commission coming up with any particular figure.

The defense has put in indications when the guidelines were first promulgated, the same loss amount would have led to an addition of 11 points, rather than 22 points. I'm not sure what's changed between then and now that makes suddenly makes this offense so much more guideline culpable. But maybe the

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government wants to say something about that.

MS. MAGDO: Your Honor, I'm not certainly an expert on why the quidelines have changed, but my understanding is that Congress had the intent to punish white collar criminals in a way that was more equal to the way they were punishing people who had committed drug offenses and violent crimes offenses.

THE COURT: When the guidelines were first promulgated in the early 1980s, all the quidelines were intended to reflect in some sense what was the mean average, except for white collar crimes, which were intended to be higher. And since then, they've been ratcheted up every few years so that they're now many times what they were when the guidelines first came in and said that they should be higher than they had been historically. So what's rational about that?

MS. MAGDO: I believe actually in 2014, they were ratcheted down slightly.

THE COURT: That was the first time that that had happened, but that was after all these major increases that I've just referred to.

MS. MAGDO: Well, as I said in my sentencing submission, the guidelines are a starting point --

THE COURT: I consider them. Consider them considered. But I don't see why they are a main starting I think they are, to be frank, a pernicious starting point, because they carry the aura but not the reality of

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Sentencing

1 something that is rationally arrived at.

Where many of these numbers come from and why, for example, should the amount of the loss be given so much more weight than, for example, the abuse of trust, which is, you so correctly point out in your memoranda, was one of the most dislikeable things that this defendant committed in his substantial fraud. And yet that is what, two points or something like that? As opposed to 22 points for the loss? It makes no sense.

MS. MAGDO: I think we can agree that the loss amount should factor in in some way in sentencing an individual.

THE COURT: We can agree on that. Maybe we'll just leave it at that.

So let's turn to the gambling disorder which is offered as a mitigating factor. I think that the defense has a witness they'd like to call.

MR. SHECHTMAN: We do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. SHECHTMAN: The defense would call Dr. Marc Potenza.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Please take the witness stand. Remain standing.

(Witness sworn)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Please be seated. State your name and spell it slowly for the record.

Potenza - direct 1 THE WITNESS: Marc Nicholas Potenza. Marc, M-A-R-C, Nicholas, N-I-C-H-O-L-A-S, P-O-T-E-N-Z-A. 2 3 THE COURT: So, since this is offered in effect as a 4 mitigating factor, the defense bears the burden, so we'll hear 5 first from the defense. Go ahead, Mr. Shechtman. MR. SHECHTMAN: Judge, I sent the Court and the 6 7 government yesterday a copy of Dr. Potenza's curricula vitae. 8 My intent --9 THE COURT: It was much too long to read, but I filed 10 it away. I gathered from your submissions that, first, that he 11 was had a very distinguished academic career at Yale, it's not 12 Swarthmore, of course, as you, Mr. Shechtman, would recognize. 13 But it's not a bad place. And now he's a well-credentialed, 14 well-published authority on addiction and gambling addiction in particular, yes? 15 16 MR. SHECHTMAN: That's correct, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: So noticed. 18 MR. SHECHTMAN: I'll proceed. 19 MARC N. POTENZA, 20 called as a witness by the Defendant, 21 having been duly sworn, testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. SHECHTMAN:

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- Dr. Potenza, what drew you to study compulsive gambling?
- Back when I was in the medical scientist training program,

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which is a combined M.D. PhD program, I was thinking about which area on which to focus my research. And I thought that the brain was the most complicated organ in the body, and that during my lifetime we were not going to understand fully how it functions, particularly with respect to health and illness, and thought I would focus on neuroscience.

THE COURT: So, I've read your report, which is very helpful. But it seems, reading between the lines, that we don't know very much about gambling addiction; particularly, we don't know much about what causes it. We have various theories, you have theories, other people have theories. But it is something of a mystery still. Yes?

THE WITNESS: I think that we've learned a lot over the past several decades, but we still have a lot more to understand, so there are many unanswered questions.

THE COURT: Well, for example, when we're dealing with a chemical addiction, like a drug addiction, we can test various chemical reactions in the brain, the drug is ingested, things happen chemically as a result.

Here, we don't really know why whatever is happening in the brain, how it's being brought about. Do I have that right?

THE WITNESS: I think in many ways, yes, that is correct. We don't have the same set of animal models, for example. Although there are inroads, Catharine Winstanley and

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others are trying to address this in ways that I think people in the substance abuse field have been addressing this for a number of decades. But we're far behind. THE COURT: So, what we really have then, if I understand your report right, is we have a series of symptoms that appear to be common to a meaningful number of people and that are characterized in the DSM by various criteria. Yes? THE WITNESS: Yes, and I think that's similar to a number of other psychiatric disorders. THE COURT: So, but even those have changed, if I understand the evolution from the DSM-3 to the DSM-5. has been some change, for example, illegal activity is no longer a necessary criterion. Yes? THE WITNESS: It is no longer an inclusionary criterion for pathological gambling or now gambling disorder. THE COURT: Because one could be a compulsive gambler and never break the law at all. THE WITNESS: One could. It is also not there for substance use disorders or substance addictions, and, like with gambling disorder, there are links with illegal activities for substance use disorders.

THE COURT: So, is it your view that there exists an effective treatment for gambling disorder?

THE WITNESS: I've been treating people for about 20 years in our public gambling treatment service in Connecticut.

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I believe we have striven to make advances with respect to both the behavioral therapies and using empirically validated therapies, behavioral therapies. We've also undertaken randomized clinical trials to see if medications might be helpful for people with gambling problems. But currently, there are no medications that have an FDA indication for pathological gambling or gambling disorder.

THE COURT: If I understand correctly, some of the studies indicate that persons with gambling disorder relapse 80, 90 percent of the time.

THE WITNESS: I think that the course of gambling disorder, we don't understand quite as well as, say, for substance use disorders, because there have been fewer longitudinal studies to investigate this.

That being said, there is also controversy as to what constitutes a relapse, whether it be a slip, a lapse, or one might consider a full-blown relapse.

THE COURT: So, let's take Mr. Caspersen. So, my understanding is that he engaged in irrational investment gambling, for lack of a better way to put it, for many years. Yes?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I think that his pattern of using options was highly risky and fits the definition of gambling.

THE COURT: What reason is there to believe that even though he's now receiving some treatment, that he won't resume

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THE WITNESS: Well, I think that while one cannot say with absolute certainty what the future might hold, there may be factors that people have reported as being linked to better versus worse treatment outcome.

the same compulsive behavior after a moderate period of time?

So, for example, in a study of Gamblers Anonymous, it was found that attendance and participation in particular as well as social supports were related to maintenance of abstinence versus relapse.

So I think those would be some of the factors that might be valuable or worthwhile to consider with respect to the hope of a more positive outcome.

THE COURT: Hope is a wonderful thing, but my understanding, first of all, is that psychiatrists and psychologists are not so good at predicting the future as opposed to analyzing the past. And that in any event, with something as still uncertain in its causes and its treatment as gambling disorder, that predicting the future is pretty problematic. Yes?

THE WITNESS: I might see it a little bit differently, given that part of my job during the week is to see people and try to help people not experience the harms that they have experienced from gambling and the harms that other people have experienced from gambling. So, I try to utilize the tools that we have, and the information that we have at the present time,

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to help people maintain abstinence and not experience the harms		
that they have experienced or that others have experienced from		
their gambling.		
THE COURT: Are you familiar with an article in the		
Canadian Medical Association Journal called "Gambling Treatment		
Options: A Roll of the Dice"?		
THE WITNESS: It's not coming to my mind. I'm not		
sure if I've read it.		
THE COURT: That particular source in that particular		
publication said that a person with gambling disorder relapse		
about 90 percent of the time.		
You came to the conclusion Mr. Caspersen had a severe		
gambling disorder. Yes?		
THE WITNESS: Correct.		
THE COURT: And that was based on a		
two-and-a-half-hour interview plus a review of his records.		
THE WITNESS: Correct.		
THE COURT: Is that an adequate basis to make such a		
diagnosis?		
THE WITNESS: I followed the approach that I use in		
making clinical diagnoses by performing a psychiatric		
evaluation. And that is the approach that I use within		
clinical settings and other settings.		
THE COURT: Well, I'm just wondering, how can one make		

such a substantial diagnosis on the basis of such a short

interview?

THE WITNESS: Based on the interview, and the collateral information and the current DSM criteria for gambling disorder, which state that one needs to meet four or more of the nine inclusionary criterion, and if they meet eight or more of the criterion that is a severe gambling disorder. That is the basis of my conclusion.

THE COURT: He also suffers from alcoholism, yes?

THE WITNESS: Yes, he -- he currently at the time of the interview, he was abstinent from alcohol, by his report I think since March of this year. But yes, he met the criteria for alcohol use disorder.

THE COURT: And from depression?

THE WITNESS: Yes, he has a history of depression by my interview.

THE COURT: So, putting all that together, wouldn't his likelihood of relapse be even higher?

THE WITNESS: Well, I think that gambling addiction disorder or pathological gambling frequently co-occurs with other psychiatric disorders, including alcohol use disorders and major depression. And we have proposed that based on the existing data, that that may actually be helpful with respect to guiding the specific therapies.

So, I'm not aware that that would necessarily increase the risk for relapse. But I think, from my perspective, I

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- would try to target those domains within a clinical treatment setting in order to optimize the likelihood that he would not relapse.
 - THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, counsel. Any questions you wanted to put.
- 6 BY MR. SHECHTMAN:
 - Q. Dr. Potenza, I take it I'm right that the DSM-3, 4 and 5 classify compulsive gambling as a mental illness. Do you agree with that?
- 10 | A. I do.
- 11 | Q. Why?
- 12 | A. Well --
- THE COURT: By the way, I'm sorry. This is a totally

 cheap shot, but I can't resist. Isn't it true that

 homosexuality was classified by the DSM-1 and 2 as a mental

 disorder?
- 17 THE WITNESS: That's my understanding.
 - THE COURT: So, perhaps this is not quite the most reliable publication.
 - THE WITNESS: Well, I think it's one of the main books of nomenclature for the psychiatric field. And I do think that as more knowledge is gained over time, that these books try to reflect the increases in knowledge.
 - So we can go back and look at, for example, in this case, teen dependence or tobacco use disorder, and if one goes

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back to the time of DSM 1 and 2, those were not considered as harmful as they are now. So, I think things evolve over time.

THE COURT: Yes, but what I guess frankly what I'm getting at is I wondered to what extent the DSM reflects, if you will, ideological views of the time as opposed to something more scientifically objective.

THE WITNESS: I think that that is a fair comment to bring up, and particularly in the area of psychiatry, psychology, where only over the past, say, quarter of a century have we gained better techniques to understand the biology.

So, I think the field tries to incorporate knowledge in a meaningful way, and I having been involved in the DSM-5 process, involved in the research work group, I can appreciate the importance that they place on understanding the neurobiology of these conditions.

THE COURT: Go ahead, counsel.

BY MR. SHECHTMAN:

- Q. Why do you agree that this is a mental illness?
- A. So, as a psychiatrist, I was trained to try to understand and help people with respect to psychological distressing or harmful thoughts or behaviors.

And I've seen a large number of people, several hundred people with gambling problems, and I've seen the impact that it can have on their, their mental states and their functioning, and believe that it is a very serious, can be a

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- very serious disorder for people.
 - Q. Pathological gambling or gambling disorder has been called an addiction without a drug. Is that an apt phrase, and what does it convey?
 - A. So, I think that it's an appropriate phrase. It's one that I've used at times. I think one can think of the term "addiction" and what it means and what it's derived from.

I think the use of the term "addiction" has varied over the course of history, derived from the Latin word meaning bound to or enslaved by. It was not linked to excessive substance use going back 100 years, excessive patterns of alcohol use. In the 1980s the DSM work group on substance use disorders I think felt almost unanimously that it could be defined by compulsive drug use.

In the 1990s, Howard Shaffer and others proposed several core elements of addiction, continued engagement in the behavior despite adverse consequences, compulsive engagement or diminished control over engagement in the behavior, and in a craving state that often preceded engagement in the behavior.

If one thinks of these as the core elements of addiction, it perhaps can be applied to a broader range of behaviors and substance use behaviors, and I think the data that have been gained over the past 20 years with respect to the neurobiological, genetic, co-occurring disorders, epidemiological clinical phenomenon, among other areas, led the

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DSM-5 substance use disorder group to reclassify pathological gambling together with substance use disorders into a substance related and addictive disorders category.

- Q. You agree with that categorization?
- A. I do. Some of the -- the two work groups in which I was involved, the research work groups, I was asked the question whether gambling disorder and substance use disorders shared similar features or not. And to go through systematically the different domains.

And the other research work group looked at obsessive compulsive spectrum disorders and whether, for example, pathological gambling was similar to or distinguished from obsessive compulsive disorder. Those data were published and used by the work groups.

THE COURT: Well, my understanding is, correct me if I'm wrong, that even our understanding of addiction has changed considerably over the last few decades. And that, for example, certain addictive drugs like cocaine don't involve really serious withdrawal symptoms in the way other drugs do, yet they still act in an addictive way because they, if you will, trick the brain into thinking that the right choice is to use the drug. Do I have that basically right?

THE WITNESS: I think that there are both similar and unique aspects to different drugs. And so, for example, with cocaine, when one is coming off of an acute intoxication, there

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is often what people describe as a cocaine crash. So, for about the 24 hours after the high of the cocaine, people become very somnolent, difficult to rouse, and oftentimes, if they're in the emergency department, will pull the sheet over their head.

Opiates have a very different pattern of withdrawal. Kicking the habit and other terms like cold turkey are derived from opiate withdrawal. Because of the piloerection and the myoclonic jerks that people experience during opiate withdrawal. So each drug has a different --

THE COURT: That's a good point. So my question then is how does gambling disorder operate in that respect?

THE WITNESS: So there's been an inclusionary criterion for withdrawal in the DSM criteria for pathological gambling as well as gambling disorder. What that typically involves is some irritability or unease during the acute period of having gambled and then not gambling, and perhaps there being other, for example, occupational obligations that keep one from gambling when one is preoccupied with the urge to gamble. It is a criterion that's acknowledged by a good number of individuals, but population-based data suggests that it's less frequently acknowledged than, say, tolerance.

THE COURT: Counsel.

BY MR. SHECHTMAN:

Q. Dr. Potenza, the legal literature talks about psychological

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gambling and sometimes uses the phrase, and some of the case law says "pathological gambling hijacks the brain." Is that a useful image?

A. It's a term that I try not to use, but I think the concept — because it's a little dramatic for me, but I think the concept that the gambling behaviors and thoughts preoccupy an individual and essentially take priority over other obligations, I think is an apt one.

So one can think of one's time as being limited and one's, you know, motivating behaviors as fitting within that timeframe. And as gambling or substance use, whatever the focus of the addiction is, takes more and more time, it forces out the other areas of life functioning that I think are important.

Q. There have been brain imaging studies relating to compulsive gambling. What, if anything, do we learn from them? A. Well, I think that the brain imaging field is at a relatively early stage. There are preliminary data that suggests that there are some similarities with substance use disorders, particularly with involvement of brain regions like the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the ventral striatum. These are considered decision-making and reward-related regions, although they serve a large number of other functions.

But, some of the data suggests that there are linkages between gambling disorders and substance use disorders, come

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from use of a monetary processing task called the monetary incentive delay task. Where initially, Halmer and colleagues found that individuals with alcoholism showed blunted activation of the ventral striatum in anticipation of monetary reward. That finding was replicated by a group in Germany. It was subsequently shown that individuals who are family history positive versus family history negative for alcoholism also showed this blunted activation of the ventral striatum. So individuals have risk for addiction, as well as adolescents who are smokers versus non-smokers.

More recently, our group and one from Korea found that individuals with pathological gambling showed a similar pattern of a blunted ventral striatum activation in anticipation of monetary reward.

THE COURT: So, just to return to what I asked you earlier. My understanding from your own submission is this is at most suggestive, this is far from anything that is firmly established to a scientific certainty or anything like that.

Right?

THE WITNESS: I agree with that. I think most of the imaging studies that have been performed to date are relatively small. And there are now efforts, for example, the ABCD Initiative is one where NIH is supporting data collection from starting at age 9 or 10, and they're targeting over a five-year period to get serial data, including brain imaging data, on

1 | over 10,000 individuals.

THE COURT: So we might know a lot more in a few years.

THE WITNESS: I'm hopeful.

data and in community population based data.

THE COURT: But I've got to sentence Mr. Caspersen today, unfortunately. So there we are. Go ahead.

BY MR. SHECHTMAN:

- Q. The judge touched on this, but is there a relationship between pathological gambling and alcohol consumption?
- A. Yes. I think that relationship is perhaps complex. There have been studies that suggest that as people drink more, they gamble more heavily. And gamble more heavily towards losses. There are also data that suggest that the two disorders co-occur more frequently than by chance, both in clinic-based

So there are data that suggests that there are both shared genetic and shared environmental contributions to the co-occurrence of pathological gambling and alcohol abuse or dependence, and that was a study involving male twins where one can make estimates of the genetic and environmental contributions.

- Q. Is there a relationship between pathological gambling and depression and add to that life trauma?
- A. Yes. So similarly is there a relationship between pathological gambling and major depression. Again, there are

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higher odds that are seen in clinical and population based samples. There are also shared genetic contributions. The best fitting model in this case from the same cohort of male twins suggested that the overlap between the two was driven 100 percent by genetic factors, although these models overestimate somewhat the genetic contributions. There is likely a substantial biological genetic link between the two.

THE COURT: I am not sure which way this cuts. So, are you saying someone who has a gambling disorder has it in part because of the depression, or are you saying the depression exists in part because of the gambling disorder, or what?

THE WITNESS: Or whether there is a common ideology to both conditions. One can make a plausible description of any of those three factors.

So one can, one of the inclusionary criteria for pathological gambling or gambling disorder is gambling to escape from a negative mood state or from dysphoria. So, if one experiences the depression, they may, for negative reinforcement purposes, so to take away the negative mood state, they may engage in gambling behaviors.

Alternatively, if one gambles excessively and, for example, loses large sums of money, that may have a negative impact on their mood, and may lead to depression, or there may be a common vulnerability factor for experiencing both

1 disorders.

THE COURT: Well, so, if you have a drug addiction, my understanding is that a part of what goes on is that while you may take the drug originally to get pleasure, that eventually you need to take the drug just to feel normal physically. But I don't see quite how that translates into the gambling disorder situation. At least I didn't see any evidence, maybe I missed it, that Mr. Caspersen had to gamble to feel physically normal. It may have been he had to gamble to feel mentally normal, but not physically.

THE WITNESS: Yes. I think that that same logic can also be applied to gambling disorder. And it resonates with people who I see in treatment who say that, you know, over time, it's not about the money. It used to be a good day at the casino was winning \$100, but then a good day at the casino is losing the \$100, but losing it over eight or 10 hours, rather than over the first 20 minutes that they're there.

So there is something about the gambling behavior that is different, it brings them to a different state. And there are studies --

THE COURT: But my only point is saying it is more in the nature of a psychological change than a physical change.

THE WITNESS: Well, so there are physiological changes that occur when people gamble. Some of these differ in people with gambling problems and those without. Gerhard Meyer in

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Germany obtained heart rate and pulse and biochemical measures of people as they gambled, people with varying level of gambling severity. Along with the --

THE COURT: Is that for people who gambled generally as opposed to people with gambling disorder?

THE WITNESS: So he was going into a casino, assessing their problem gambling severity, so whether they had a gambling problem or not, and was collecting the data so he could look at those sorts of questions.

THE COURT: I see.

Counsel.

BY MR. SHECHTMAN:

- O. And life trauma.
- A. And life trauma. Yes, so there have been multiple studies that have looked at -- although not as many as in some other areas of problem pathological gambling -- that have looked at reports of trauma in individuals with gambling problems. And there are high rates of trauma that are reported, and some studies over 60 percent of individuals with gambling problems report emotional trauma, over 20 percent report sexual trauma, and there are links between pathological gambling and trauma related conditions, like post-traumatic stress disorder.
- Q. Again, a question the judge touched on. Would you speak more broadly about the relationship between severe pathological gambling and crime and embezzlement and theft?

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A. Yeah. So there have been studies, several studies that have looked at this question. Some have looked at data from population based studies, so Mariana Tosheko Stein did an analysis of different classes of individuals, a data driven approach, and found that it was the illegal behaviors tended to cluster in the most severe group of individuals with gambling problems. And that seems to fit with my clinical experience. And we've also looked at data from people calling from a gambling helpline and looked at people who reported illegal behaviors related to gambling versus those who did not, and there were factors that suggested there were more severe psychological, psychiatric concerns, as well as impacts like debt and suicidality.

THE COURT: But, again I'm not totally sure which way this cuts. If someone commits an embezzlement out of greed, let's say, they make a more or less rational determination, I can get away with it, and I'll be rich, and live the lifestyle that I always wanted. And then they're caught and they receive some honest prison time, and they say, hmm, I made the wrong bet, and I'm not going to do it again, because it's not — the downside outweighs the upside.

But, if you have someone, as I understand what you're telling me about gambling disorder, they won't be making a rational choice. And therefore, it would take, one might argue, a much more severe sentence to really bring home to them

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there is no way that even someone in their diminished state could understand that this is a bad bet.

So maybe this is not a question for you really, more for counsel. I'm not sure which way this cuts.

THE WITNESS: Well, and there may be individual differences within that group that I think are important to consider. I've seen a number of people in practice, clinical practice, who, for example, have led very what one might consider exemplary lives, but have embezzled money related to their gambling, but otherwise morally upstanding citizens. And those are some of the people actually I've seen over the longer term who have done well, and have given back to the community in a positive way.

THE COURT: Counsel.

BY MR. SHECHTMAN:

- Q. When we spoke on Wednesday, you talked about one older woman who fell in that category. Would you tell the Court about that?
- A. I think that there are several older women who I've seen in treatment who have had problems with casino gambling and have embezzled money. And, you know, some may volunteer time to help people with gambling problems, some go back to jobs and contribute to society in a meaningful way and have meaningful relationships.
- Q. They taught me at my college that it's hard to prove a

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negative. But, is there a sense of why some pathological gamblers don't steal?

- A. Well, there may be differences, and I was touching bases on some of the illegal behavior data that we and other groups have looked at. There may be different individual differences that people have that they experience, either inherently or they experience in life experiences. And there are differences between people with gambling problems, and it is important to understand those individual differences.
- Q. Opportunity play a role?
- A. Also, with respect to opportunity, and I think that that does play a role with respect to gambling behaviors and the extent of gambling problems that people can experience. So having the opportunity to obtain or have large amounts of money, I think that's an important consideration.

When we were doing our initial study of gambling urges, and I solicited the advice of several people in the state who had more experience than I did at the time with respect to treating individuals with gambling problems, and they noted that one of the triggers for people is to come into a large amount of money, and that's one of the opportunities that I think may play a significant role for people with gambling problems. And some of the behavioral therapies work on financial management aspects, and whether other people are going to manage finances for the individual with the gambling

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problem, for example, is sometimes a very important consideration.

THE COURT: So you think that the best thing I could do for Mr. Caspersen is put him on welfare and make sure he has no money whatsoever.

THE WITNESS: That wasn't the approach that we take in our clinic. But what we try to do is if there is a conservator who -- or some like a spouse, for example, who is may be engaged in Gam-Anon, may be able to able to set limits and help protect the vulnerabilities in someone who they may care for. That's more where I was going.

- Q. How severe did you find Mr. Caspersen's gambling addiction to be?
- A. As I mentioned briefly, I would grade it as a severe gambling disorder.

THE COURT: Meaning that he hits a large number of the criteria set forth in the DSM, yes?

THE WITNESS: Yes, but I should also mention that of all the people I've seen in treatment, I cannot recall anyone who had lost the amount of money that — the financial amount of money that he did. I've seen people who have come in with six figure debts and went through bankruptcy. That's not — I mean, I can think of a number of people. But this amount of money is —

THE COURT: In one sense, the reason the amounts of

GB43CASS Potenza - direct

money were so large is he was gambling in investments as opposed to gambling at the casino, correct?

THE WITNESS: I think he could gamble more money in this area, yeah.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

Q. For a part of 2013, for about seven months, from roughly six months from May to November, Mr. Caspersen did not gamble.

Does that alter your conclusion about his pathology?

A. No. I still think he meets the criteria for a severe gambling disorder. There may be different factors, and some that we don't understand, that influence why people go from gambling large amounts of money to nothing. Same with substance use disorder and trying to understand those patterns I think is important.

With gambling problems, a number of people have told me that while they may feel the urge to gamble, they don't have the money at hand, so that can be one of the main factors. But there may be others. Sometimes, you know, I think that the number of people do feel ambivalent about gambling, people with gambling problems, and there may be things that sway them one way or the other. Something that triggers and moves them to gamble, and something that helps intervene and something that — close friends, relatives, treatment providers, hopefully help them restrain them from gambling.

Q. I want to go back to a question that Judge Rakoff asked

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Potenza - direct

- He asked about physical symptoms. And I think when we spoke, you told me about a patient or patients suffering from pain and the effect of gambling on them?
 - So there have been some people who have chronic pain conditions who have reported to me that when they are in the process of gambling, that that kind of dissipates, it goes away. So this fits into this negative reinforcement model of getting to -- of gambling and perhaps gambling excessively in order to relieve an uncomfortable state.

THE COURT: Did Mr. Caspersen report that? THE WITNESS: No.

- One gets the sense from the literature, and I think, again, Judge Rakoff alluded to this, that for many gamblers, money doesn't matter after a certain point. It's about being in the action. Is that consistent with your experience?
- A. A number of people who I've seen with gambling problems do report that. That it's less about the wins and losses than it is about the act of gambling, and what they experience from gambling.
- Then again to my last question, to go back to another topic that Judge Rakoff asked you about, what can be done mitigate the risks of Mr. Caspersen recidivating?
- I think that there are -- while there is a lot that we don't know about what is most helpful for people, there are factors that have been linked to successful treatment outcome.

Potenza - direct

Some of that is engagement in professional treatment, some of that is engagement in 12-step programs, so Gamblers Anonymous, which is modeled after Alcoholics Anonymous, has been around for more than half a century and is widely available around the world. Hasn't been as well studied as some other forms of treatment, I think because of its anonymous nature. But data do suggest, for example, from Nancy Petry's trial, that people who attend GA tend to fair better than those who do not with respect to gambling treatment outcome. And some of the factors such as adherence and participation and the associate support do appear linked to better treatment outcome within a group of people attending GA, so those would be I think important factors.

- Q. I won't take you through all 12 steps, but I'll ask you about the first one and why you think it is significant.
- A. Yes. So I think some people have described addictions as a disorder of decision making or as motivated behaviors gone awry, and I think that the first step that to admit that one is powerless over the behavior, that essentially removes that aspect of the decision-making process. And if people can accept that, and can accept that they cannot go back to gambling because it leads to all these negative consequences, then it removes that, and it actually empowers them to lead to more healthy lives.
- Q. Mr. Caspersen is, as part of his therapy, has been

prescribed naltrexone, if I say it right. Will you tell the Court what that drug does.

- A. Naltrexone blocks opioid receptors. It is a medication that has an FDA indication for opioid use disorders and alcohol use disorders. So going back now close to a quarter of a century, there were clinical trials that found that for people with alcohol use problems, that it seemed to target alcohol urges or cravings and lead to better outcomes. We, amongst other groups, have hypothesized it may be helpful for people with gambling problems based on that aspect as well as how it's thought to work with respect to influencing reward pathways in the brain. And there have been several placebo controlled trials that have found naltrexone to be superior to placebo, but the data are mixed and we don't have an FDA medication for gambling disorder.
- Q. Just so the record is clear, you saw Mr. Caspersen for two and a half to three hours, reviewed his medical records, the option trading experts report, his own therapist's report, and his trading records. Do I have the universe?
- A. Yes, that is correct.

MR. SHECHTMAN: Judge, I thank the Court.

THE COURT: All right. Any questions from government?

MS. MAGDO: Yes, your Honor.

24 CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MS. MAGDO:

Potenza - Cross

- 1 Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Potenza.
 - A. Good afternoon.
- 3 Q. So, you testified that you've seen hundreds of individuals
- 4 | with pathological gambling and other impulse control disorders,
- 5 | right?

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- A. Correct.
- 7 | Q. And would it be fair to say that of those hundreds, there
- 8 were many whose disorders you would character identify as
- 9 || severe?
- 10 | A. Yes.
- 11 | Q. And of those who had severe disorders who came in for
- 12 | treatment, they came for a variety of different reasons I
- 13 | imagine, right?
- 14 A. Correct.
- 15 | Q. So maybe some of them came because they'd lost all their
- 16 money?
- 17 | A. Yeah.
- 18 Q. Some may have lost their house?
- 19 | A. I'm not -- no one is coming to my mind with their house.
- 20 But people have lost a lot of money, people have been sent by
- 21 | the legal system, particularly people with substance use
- 22 problems, but also some people with gambling problems. There
- 23 are a number of factors, spouses finding out about gambling
- 24 | behaviors.
- 25 Q. Okay. So, is it fair to say that the vast majority of

Potenza - Cross

- those that you've seen with a gambling disorder have not come because they've been arrested?
- A. Majority have not come because they have been arrested, that is correct.
 - Q. I think you mentioned some things that you use. Some options that you use to treat people with gambling disorders.

 There is individual therapy, right?
 - A. Correct.
 - Q. Group therapy, GA meetings, right?
- 10 A. Group therapy. What was the --
- 11 | Q. GA?

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- 12 | A. GA, yes.
- Q. What about involving their families in treating. Can you explain how that would work?
 - A. Yes. So, I'm the medical director and the psychiatric consultant to the Problem Gambling Services Program for Connecticut. It's gone through various iterations over the past 20 years. But we have counselors within the program, some of whom, for examples, are social workers, and some who are very focused on involving family members, and it is something that we consider in treatment. Sometimes that's done in couples, sometime that's done individually, because sometimes it's helpful for spouses or partners to gain skills that will be helpful for themselves. Because oftentimes people who are close to people with gambling problems experience psychological

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Potenza - Cross

distress and maybe go through depression, anxiety. So we try to help them get the help that they need, as well as help them, assuming that they want to maintain the relationship and be in the dynamic relationship going forward, to help them gain skills that would be helpful for that relationship to be healthv.

- Q. You mentioned that there are certain safeguards that are sometimes put in place, such as having a conservator take over an individual's assets. Is that something you frequently use in therapy or in connection with therapy?
- So, having someone help with financial management more broadly, whether that's an official conservator, that's less, less frequent than perhaps not having the person have credit cards, not -- you know, having an amount of money that they get over a certain period of time to allow them to get done what they need to get done, but to minimize the risk of getting into a place where they accrue, for example, credit card debt.
- Q. Do any other safeguards come to mind that you put in place to make sure that people aren't subject to temptation that causes the behavior or that brings on the behavior?
- A. Well, there are a number of options that we consider and that we may implement on a patient-by-patient basis. Some of that involves skill building, so having people deal more effectively with triggers. So sometimes people are not aware of those triggers, sometimes people are not aware of the

Potenza - Cross

internal stakes that are generated by those triggers, so helping them manage. Identify those and manage those in a more healthy way I think is important.

Some of it depends on the type of gambling that's problematic. So, in Connecticut we have two large casinos, two of the world's largest casinos, so a number of people I see have problems with casino gambling, and both casinos in gambling have self-exclusion options. So some people self-exclude in order to minimize the temptation for casino gambling, for example.

- Q. So following on that example, if you had a patient who was employed at a casino, for example, and had trouble with casino gambling, would you encourage that patient to find a different job?
- A. I would go over the potential risk of exposing one to being at a casino and to consider that.
- Q. Do you find that these types of precautions are met with success on at least some occasions?
- 19 A. Yes.
 - Q. So, those people who have gambling disorder -- and I just want to clarify what you've said in your report and just make sure we're all on the same page. They haven't lost their ability to control their behavior. I believe what you wrote is that they have diminished self-control. Can you explain what that means?

Potenza - Cross

- A. Yeah. So I think this applies to addictions more broadly.
- 2 That it is a decision-making process whether or not to engage
- 3 | in a motivating behavior. And that, that process I think is
- 4 | not operating in a healthy fashion in people with addictions,
- 5 | including with gambling disorder.
- 6 Q. Now, a couple questions specific to the defendant in this
- 7 case. You mentioned in your report, and I quote from page 23,
- 8 | that the defendant reports having struggled with trying to stop
- 9 | trading, setting self-imposed limits, and then breaking them.
- 10 Now, you start the sentence off with "he reports," so that's
- 11 something that he told you, right?
- 12 A. Hmm-hmm.
- 13 Q. That's not something that you verified or were able to
- 14 | verify, right?
- 15 | A. Well, in a psychiatric interview, that's the language that
- 16 | I use. It's done usually on a one-to-one basis, and people are
- 17 | sharing information. For struggles, it's an internal state.
- 18 It's kind of like how do you assess depression. You know, how
- 19 do you assess someone's internal mood state. And it's usually
- 20 through direct asking and trying to understand it within the
- 21 context.
- 22 | THE COURT: But I think what the prosecutor is trying
- 23 | to get at is the psychiatrist is necessarily dependent for
- 24 | information to a substantial degree on what the patient tells
- 25 | the psychiatrist. And if the patient has a motive to lie, then

Potenza - Cross

that information might not be as reliable as it would otherwise be.

So, the question is, in this case, theoretically,

Mr. Caspersen has a motive to want to be diagnosed as a severe
gambling addict. So, was there any way, other than the -- you
had some records, but was there anything else that was done to
sort of test whether he was giving you the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, as opposed to an
exaggeration, for example?

THE WITNESS: Well, in looking through the records that were provided to me as collateral information, what he reported to me seemed to fit well with the records with respect to things like preoccupation and placing of options, like, right when the -- when the market opened, the -- it seemed genuine to me during the interview, and it seemed to fit with the psychiatric report for people who had been seeing him over a longer period of time and arguably may have known him better through more repeated contact.

THE COURT: The earlier questions put by the prosecutor, I wasn't quite sure what she was getting at, but she seemed to be suggesting that the Court might want to imprison Mr. Caspersen in part because it would take him away from all temptation. I concede, I'm sure the warden would make an excellent fiduciary of his assets, but I don't know if this is within your area of expertise, but are there respects in

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Potenza - Cross

which imprisonment would in your view make his condition worse?

THE WITNESS: Well, I have interviewed some people in

prison. And it doesn't -- there is, one, there is gambling

that goes on in prison. There isn't always optimal access to

treatment in prison. So I think there are some aspects of

imprisonment that may not be very good.

THE COURT: Counsel.

BY MS. MAGDO:

- Q. You mentioned that you -- the things that Mr. Caspersen told you in your assessment were consistent with the reports of other therapists that you had reviewed. So, I believe you reviewed a report or a report of Dr. Goldman. And isn't it true that Dr. Goldman has only been the defendant's treating
- A. That's my understanding, yes.

psychiatrist after his arrest?

- Q. The notes that you reviewed from prior to his arrest, those were from 2012 and 2013, right?
 - A. And some I think earlier too, from the early 2000s.
- Q. So in the early 2000 reports, those were purely medical reports as opposed to psychological reports, right?
- 21 A. Yes. There may have been a psychological testing, I don't recall the date of that.
- Q. For the most part, the pre-arrest psychological report that you relied on are the notes from Dr. Brody in his seven
- 25 sessions with Mr. Caspersen, right?

GB43CASS Potenza - Cross

- 1 A. That's my recollection.
- 2 Q. Okay. And in those notes, did the defendant say to
- 3 Dr. Brody that he had stopped his gambling behavior, if you
- 4 recall?
- 5 A. I don't recall whether he had mentioned that. I know that
- 6 there was more of a focus on the gambling after the arrest. I
- 7 | think that my experience with people with gambling problems is
- 8 | that oftentimes it is difficult for them to come into
- 9 | treatment, and I think part of that may have occurred early in
- 10 | the 2000s. He may have been a bit more forthcoming later on,
- 11 | around 2012.
- But I think that it's not uncommon for me to see there
- 13 | being different barriers, be it guilt, embarrassment, shame, be
- 14 | it ambivalence about acknowledging the gambling problem and
- 15 | addressing the gambling problem. It's consistent with what
- 16 I've encountered, and I think data suggests that it's about
- 17 | 10 percent of individuals with gambling problems who engage in
- 18 some form of treatment.
- 19 Q. I guess what I'd like to differentiate between is the
- 20 | treatment that he had after he was arrested. By that point, he
- 21 knows that he's been charged with crimes, and he knows that he
- 22 | will eventually be sentenced. Right?
- 23 | A. I --
- 24 | Q. Presumably?
- 25 A. I presume so.

Potenza - Cross

1 | Q. So as the judge implied --

THE COURT: Well, if he doesn't know that by now, he's under a great illusion.

MS. MAGDO: Right.

Q. My point is that in the therapy that he engaged in after he was arrested, didn't he have an incentive to exaggerate his symptoms, knowing this was in preparation for sentencing?

I'm not asking whether he did or not. Is it logical to assume that one would have a different incentive after one is arrested than before one is arrested?

- A. That's one possibility. But it's not the only possibility. I think that as his trading records indicate, he was gambling large amounts of money, and I imagine and it's consistent with his reports that this was associated with significant psychological distress.
- Q. Are you aware that by the time he sought treatment, in November 2012, he had already committed a fraud of over \$2 million? Yes?
- 19 A. Yes.
 - Q. Are you aware that he lied to that therapist, that, for example, he said that he was actively pursuing career options outside of the financial services industry?
 - A. Well, lying about gambling behaviors is actually one of the criteria that persists in DSM-5, so again, it wouldn't surprise me. I think it speaks to the ambivalence that many people have

Potenza - Cross

- about giving up gambling. 1
- And isn't it true that Dr. Brody recommended that he hire a 2 Ο.
- 3 financial manager to stand between him and his remaining
- 4 assets?

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- 5 That may well be true.
- 6 Do you know whether he did that? 0.
 - I don't believe that that happened, but I'm not certain.
- So, would you agree with Dr. Brody's conclusion in his 8
- 9 report that, prior to his arrest, earlier this year,
- 10 Mr. Caspersen had not made any serious attempts to stop
- 11 gambling?
- 12 MR. SHECHTMAN: Judge, I'll stipulate to that. But he
- 13 couldn't say that prior to the arrest, because this is 2012.
- 14 So there's --
- 15 MS. MAGDO: I'm sorry. Not Dr. Brody. Dr. Goldman's
- 16 assessment post-arrest. I misspoke.
- 17 Q. Dr. Goldman, who has been the defendant's treating
- psychiatrist since April of this year who has been seeing him 18
- 19 twice a week. And in his report, which I believe you reviewed,
- 20 he concludes that the defendant never made any serious effort
- 21 to stop gambling.
- 22 Do you agree with that conclusion?
- 23 I think it depends on what you describe as a serious
- 24 I think that he did not engage in formal treatment, effort.
- 25 which would have been a more serious effort. I imagine that he

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Potenza - Cross

may have struggled with his behavior, and that is consistent with what he reported with the self-imposed limits.

THE COURT: A variation on that, assuming he didn't make a serious effort, on the one hand, that might be consistent with his not taking the problems and deceits he was imposing on others very seriously. But on the other hand, it might just simply reflect the severity of his own gambling disorder. Yes?

> THE WITNESS: Yes. That's my feeling, my impression.

- I'd just like to go briefly over some other psychiatric disorders that are in the DSM-5 I believe. Exhibitionist disorder. Are you familiar with that?
- It's not an area that I focused on. Α.

area of focus in psychiatry.

- Would you say that people who have this disorder have a diminished ability to stop exposing themselves to other people?
- So, people who seek treatment for or engage in exhibitionist behavior I would imagine do have some impaired self-control over their behaviors. Although, I can't recall having seen someone with exhibitionism, so it is really not my

THE COURT: Counsel, where do you see -- I'm looking at the DSM criteria, DSM-5 criteria for gambling disorder. And I'm not seeing exhibitionism. Maybe I'm missing it.

MS. MAGDO: I'm sorry. I'm moving on to other disorders, not gambling disorders.

THE COURT: 1 Oh.

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conduct disorders.

But other disorders that may lead to MS. MAGDO: antisocial or illegal conduct, and I'm just trying to elicit that these are also classified as mental illnesses and mental disorders in the DSM-5, and that these disorders such as pyromania, cleptomania, pedophilic disorder, may make it more difficult for people to control these behaviors. That's all I want him to opine on.

THE COURT: Okay. I thought you were making a comment on the current political contest for the presidential election, but I guess I was wrong. Go ahead.

MS. MAGDO: I hadn't gotten to sexual sadism disorder yet, which is a thing.

- Q. So is it fair to say that people who have these disorders may have some impaired ability to control their behaviors?
- I think impaired impulse control does apply to a broad range of psychiatric conditions, across different categorizations. I think the DSM-5 as compared to the DSM-4 was trying to take what was a heterogeneous grouping of disorders, in which pathological gambling was placed, and when it was classified with cleptomania and pyromania, and separate it from and include it in the addictive disorders. And now that what used to be impulse control disorders not elsewhere classified in DSM-4 is now disruptive impulse control and

So they've grouped together disorders that are more categorized by going up against social norms, if you will, and removed gambling disorder together with the addictive and substance abuse.

- Q. That's arbitrary. If we lived in a society where gambling were illegal, it would be next to cleptomania, presumably.
- A. Well, I'm not going to speculate.
- Q. My point simply is that these disorders, maybe they're not in the same chapter of the DSM, they have certain things in common. Namely, that they may impair somebody's ability to control their behavior. I'm opposing that to disorders where someone has no ability whatsoever to control their behavior.

So would you say that these disorders that I've named have that in common, they diminish someone's capacity to control their behavior?

- A. I think that having no control over one's behavior is not -- I can't think of any instances where that happens on a regular basis. I think it is more that a number of conditions are categorized by impaired impulse control. And it goes across a broad range of categories.
- Q. For example, someone who is diagnosed with pedophilic disorder, do you know, is that a mitigating factor for someone who has committed a crime of child molestation?

THE COURT: Counsel, these are fair arguments when we hear argument from counsel, but I don't think it really is a

question for this witness. You can certainly make that argument in a few minutes when I hear from counsel on this.

MS. MAGDO: That's fine. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very good. Anything further from defense?

MR. SHECHTMAN: Nothing, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you so much. You may step down.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

(Witness excused)

THE COURT: So, before we turn to other aspects of this sentence, let me hear from counsel and I'll tell you what my initial take on this is, subject to being further influenced by counsel.

So, I think that while we don't know nearly as much about it as we know about some other disorders, I think it is more likely than not that there is such a thing as gambling disorder and that Mr. Caspersen suffered from it, and that it diminished his ability to make rational decisions. What follows from all that is less clear.

But just on those propositions, let me hear if counsel want to make further argument before I adopt those very limited initial determinations.

MR. SHECHTMAN: Judge, I don't have further argument.

Our point on calling Dr. Potenza was to establish just those points. I think the question what follows from that is sentencing.

THE COURT: We'll get to that in a minute.

MR. SHECHTMAN: I mean that not glibly. But what follows from that is a very difficult moral judgment for the Court. And what's important to us is to realize that this is a fellow with a severe, most severe pathological gambling problem. This is a fellow who acted irrationally for a long period of time as to his own money and then as to others. And that all of that should weigh heavily in the balance this afternoon.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from the government.

MS. MAGDO: Your Honor, I agree with Mr. Shechtman that the remaining issue is really what weight the Court should give to Mr. Caspersen's gambling addiction as a mitigating factor, rather than whether he had one. So, I don't oppose --

THE COURT: I think there are two aspects of that, that maybe you want to comment on. There was at least a suggestion in the government's papers, and there are certainly some reported cases and some statements of the sentencing commission at an earlier time, that suggest that it should have no weight. And I'm frank to say I don't understand that.

Among the most fundamental programs of our legal system when it comes to crime are that we distinguish between people who commit crimes because they have made a rational choice that they would rather do something antisocial and harmful to others in order to gain their material benefits or other benefits, and

those who act with diminished capacity and who are to some degree not acting with a full deck.

And the reason the legal system makes that distinction is because the criminal justice system in particular is an expression, among other things, of fundamental moral principles.

So for example, there was a suggestion in one of the cases the government brought to my attention, although I think I interpreted it somewhat differently than the government did, that motive is irrelevant. How can that be?

MS. MAGDO: Well --

THE COURT: How can it be that if someone steals a loaf of bread, to take the classic example, because they're starving, they are treated the same as someone who steals a loaf of bread because they walked down street and saw a nice loaf of bread and thought he'd like to eat it right then and there rather than when he got home to his 20 other loaves of bread.

So, it seems to me it is relevant. Maybe I'm mischaracterizing government's position.

MS. MAGDO: That's certainly not our position, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. MAGDO: And we are not saying that gambling disorder could never be a mitigating factor in sentencing. And

we're not saying that it should be ignored here in this case.

We are saying that the Court should consider it. But, that in
the context of this defendant, and of these crimes, that there
are other things that outweigh whatever mitigation the gambling
disorder provides.

THE COURT: That's important. I want to get to those in a minute. But let me just raise the other concern I had while we're still on the gambling disorder.

I'm somewhat troubled by the fact that I don't think we know enough about gambling disorder to be able to speak of an effective treatment with any degree of confidence. There are some studies that suggest some drugs may help. There are some studies that suggest that cognitive therapy may help.

These are all very soft, very preliminary, very many of them have not been attempted to be reproduced, many of them have not been subject to long-term studies. Our very excellent expert pointed out, for example, that statistically a lot of studies so far have dealt with very small numbers, and that a much bigger study is underway but it isn't there yet.

And so while gambling disorder may be a mitigating factor in the sense it reduces the immorality of the underlying behavior, if it is to take the extreme incurable -- and I'm not suggesting that that's the extreme, but just to give that as the end of the curve so to speak, then I'm not sure that it should weigh that much with the Court, because the guy will be

a recidivist.

Now, again, I'm not saying that's the situation here, but I'm concerned about that aspect of it. I don't know if either side wanted to comment on that.

Maybe that's more of a question for Mr. Shechtman.

MS. MAGDO: Actually, it is something that I've thought about a lot, which is that to the extent that he gets a break for his motivation or his lack of nefarious motivation at the outset, there is also the continuing disorder which he will presumably be struggling with to some extent or another for the rest of his life, just the way an alcoholic is never fully cured.

I think it is interesting, actually, in some child exploitation cases, the fact that the defendant does not have a sexual interest in children and was merely trading the child pornography for money, is actually a reason that people say that that person will not reoffend, because they weren't doing it out of a disorder. It makes perhaps the initial motivation more egregious and more worthy of punishment, but perhaps the recidivism risk is lower, whereas here it's just the opposite.

So, I think that's another reason that a significant sentence is warranted, especially because we submit that this defendant is already a bit of a recidivist. In 2012 he committed a fraud on his mother and his brother over \$2 million. I mean, he's lucky that they didn't, you know, go to

the police with that. That's a crime. And yet, even that was only enough to deter him for a few months.

He's not undeterrable. He stopped trading for a long period in 2013. But, that was not enough to make him commit seriously to getting himself better. So that's why we think a substantial sentence is needed to convince him of that.

THE COURT: Mr. Shechtman, before we hear your general comments, I want to give you a chance to comment on the comments just raised.

MR. SHECHTMAN: Judge, let me say something just about the facts of 2013, which I shared with Ms. Magdo last week.

And the facts really go to your question, your last question I think to Dr. Potenza about the severity of the gambling, meaning not dealing with this appropriately in 2012.

And Mr. Caspersen would be the first person to tell you that, that he didn't. 2012 treatment records end in March of 2013 with a statement "the gambling disorder is in remission." It wasn't.

And what's particularly interesting is in the first months of 2013, while he was getting treatment, he was getting relatively small — for Mr. Caspersen — distributions from the family, \$50,000, \$20,000, four or five of them. And each time he got them, money went directly to his trading account. He gambled and he lost everything.

And then in April 2013, he had no more. And when it

got to the end of that year, he had a \$4,900 bonus the end of 2013. And the day he got it, he put it into his trading account, and he traded. So, I would say the 2013 story is the story of most severe pathological gambler.

Look, I've done this for a long time, you've done it and sat in judgment of people even longer, and I can't tell you that Andrew Caspersen won't recidivate. It's been a bad history since 2000.

But I can tell you that he is seeing a therapist who believes in him and has written the Court in a long portion of that letter why he thinks that there is a real likelihood here, a high likelihood here of non-recidivism.

I'm not going to point them out, but you've got four pathological gamblers in the back, two of them lawyers, and they have not gambled for a long period of time. And they have not gambled because the craziest thing is, Gamblers Anonymous, which, look, I would joke about Alcohol Anonymous, I would say it is a place where people go to date, right, I think people who take it seriously go for treatment.

And what you learn about Gamblers Anonymous, and what Mr. Caspersen's learned, is it's an extraordinary support group. He went Tuesday night and discouraged people from coming today in the view that you didn't need to see the faces of 30 pathological gamblers. But all of them have stayed out of trouble by propping each other up. His two supporters, his

two principal supporters are here today.

Look, they will tell you that there are people in that group who fail. But they'll also tell you that the vast majority of people in those groups have succeeded because of each other. And that is fairly remarkable. And I know how committed Andrew Caspersen is, I don't think he'll disappoint the Court.

I suppose if he does, we'll be back before you or somebody else and some other lawyer won't be able to say what I'm saying today. But, today what I'm saying is I don't think Andrew Caspersen is a high risk of recidivism.

I think he went through an enormous trauma. His girlfriend's death, his father's death, and his own depression, and always found a way --

THE COURT: I didn't ask the expert about those traumas because I didn't think he had particularly, he mentions them in his report, but it wasn't a focus. But, I'm not sure how much weight, if any, I should put on them, and I'll tell you why, and then you can respond.

So, undoubtedly the death of his girlfriend in 9/11 was very traumatic. But, he turned his life around in that respect, and he entered into a loving relationship with another fine woman, and he married her and had children and was from all reports a good father and so forth.

So he overcame that from all objective indicia in the

way that other people overcome the traumas that all of us in life sooner or later encounter.

With respect to his father, which again, I don't mean to minimize at all, but my understanding is that his father killed himself at the age of something like 67, I believe, because he was in great pain from incurable cancer. And so it was — this is unfair, perhaps — but as a form of euthanasia, and he left a note indicating that so to speak. And so, undoubtedly, when one loses a parent that one is close to, that has traumatic effects. I don't mean to minimize that. But it wasn't — I'm having some difficulty associating either of those events with the pathological gambling.

MR. SHECHTMAN: Let me say this. If I was sitting where you were, I could add a point to that, which is his gambling began before Cat's death, and indeed he lost \$2 million before Cat's death. But having said that, I would add the following. That was for Andrew Caspersen an extraordinarily traumatic event. You have Mrs. MacRae's description of it, you have Andrew's mother's description of it, of really a sort of almost a year-long suicide watch.

And the story of his father's death is more complicated. It is alluded to in Dr. Goldman's letter. There were, as Dr. Goldman says, financial improprieties connected to that. So the reason for the suicide that is given in press accounts I think is not the full story of that event, and this

was a reverential relationship, and for good reason. If one knows of Ben Caspersen, he was as philanthropic a man as one could find. And whether Princeton or Harvard --

THE COURT: I've forgiven him that.

MR. SHECHTMAN: And it was a real trauma, and the full story of it weighed heavily on Andrew Caspersen.

I guess I'd say this. That's as good a woman as there is. That's the wife I am being rude and pointing to. But, we all know from the lives of our friends, you can be married to a very fine person and hide depression. And I think Andrew Caspersen went through most of his adult life with depression that was exacerbated by two very real and meaningful events, and is a piece of this story.

But I'll go back to where I started, which is there are no guarantees. Your Honor has probably sentenced many people who stood before you and said "I'll never do it again," only to see them again at probation hearings. There are no certainties.

It's a bad day to say "I bet." But I bet on Andrew Caspersen not recidivating.

THE COURT: All right. So, let's move to the general factors that bear on sentence, which are set forth in Section 3553(a) of Title 18. And I think it's worth remembering what that statute says. This is the mandate of Congress. Unlike the guidelines, this is binding on the Court.

And it begins: The Court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph two of this subsection.

The Court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider, and the first item, not the one referred to as paragraph two, but before we even reach paragraph two, we have paragraph one: The nature and circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of the defendant.

Now, here I think as to the first part of that, there is no disagreement among counsel that this was an egregious offense by any possible measure or view. It was a substantial fraud, it was a fraud that involved the deception of numerous people who had great confidence and faith in the defendant. It was a fraud that used people. And it was a fraud that had continued for a substantial period of time, and might have continued for even more time, had one of the victims not become wary.

I think there is less agreement, but I think maybe now substantial agreement nevertheless, on the history and characteristics of the defendant. Which I think there is agreement that, other than this very considerable lapse, that he led a very upstanding life, was an outstanding citizen, very well regarded for good reason, all set forth in the many excellent letters that I've received on his behalf. And that

his failing was at least in material part a reflection of a gambling disorder.

So unless there is disagreement about that, I'd like to move to the paragraph two. But let me find out if there is anything further either counsel wants to say about paragraph one.

MR. SHECHTMAN: Nothing, your Honor.

MS. MAGDO: Just briefly, your Honor. You mentioned that the crime was committed in material part to feed the gambling addiction. And I know that the defense has characterized this as mere serendipity, but I don't think it's just bad luck when a fraudster pays off a \$2 million apartment that's leveraged to the hilt entirely with crime proceeds, and at the same time purchases a \$3 million -- \$3.2 million home in Westchester, at around the same time.

I think it's just a little bit disingenuous to say that -- they literally used the words "no choice." I just, I cannot let that stand without comment.

THE COURT: I thought there was agreement that he had diminished capacity, but still had voluntary capacity, and could have stopped this at any time.

But what is also notable is that at times when he had made a ton of money, and could have paid everyone back, he went and reinvested that money in another of these extraordinarily high risk bets, and lost it all. So, that is at least I think

strongly indicative of someone who is not playing with a full deck. Because you can well imagine — and he had gone through that process several times before. And so now, he hits it big, he's in a position to pay off everyone, and I think if I recall correctly, have about \$50 million left for himself.

So, every rational part of his mind would have said thank God I've escaped, they'll never know, I can go back to a less stressful existence, and I'll wind up a rich man, and the whole thing will be over. And instead, goes and repeats the same high risk betting as he did before.

To my mind, that was very strong evidence of the severity of his gambling disorder.

MS. MAGDO: Your Honor, as we've said, we're not challenging that he had some impairment due to a gambling disorder. I just don't want the record to reflect that there was no use of victim money for personal benefit, other than gambling.

THE COURT: At no time was Mr. Caspersen leading the life of the 99 percent as opposed to the 1 percent. I will take that as a given.

I'm sorry, you had other things?

MS. MAGDO: I just had one other thing briefly. Your Honor referenced the -- I believe you used the word "excellent letters." And no doubt those are excellent letters. But I would just like to point out that three of the four people who

have known the defendant since birth, namely his three older brothers, have not written letters. And I think that just bears mentioning.

THE COURT: That's not irrelevant. If I were in your place, I would be more inclined to emphasize the letters from the victims that were submitted by the government, which point out quite eloquently in their own right how much the victims were hurt by this crime. Not only in their investments, but in their reputation in the kind of businesses that they were conducting. All of that was put at risk, and Mr. Caspersen was quite prepared to put it even more at risk.

MS. MAGDO: Oh, absolutely.

THE COURT: I think that's -- I'm not sure how much inference one should draw from the absence of any particular person writing a letter. I think the Court should pay more attention to what is before the Court than to what is not before the Court, is my only point.

MS. MAGDO: Certainly. Thank you.

THE COURT: Let's turn to Subsection 2 of Section 3553(a). The need for the sentence imposed (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.

And I read that to mean that under any conceivable analysis there has to be prison time or (A) would not be achieved. The big question, of course, is how much prison

time.

Then we get to (B) and (C). (B) is to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and (C) is to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.

I think (B) when read in context of (C) is talking about specific deterrence, and (C) is talking about general deterrence. So, on specific deterrence, this is the point I raised earlier, I think the disorder cuts both ways. If it is so severe as everyone, all the psychologists seem to agree, then at least the argument can be made that that calls for a higher prison time because it really requires meaningful prison time to convince the defendant never to do it again.

However, all the studies I've read over the years in many white collar cases, all suggest that that is in fact not how deterrence, specific deterrence works in white collar contexts. None of this is hard science or anything like that. But, there are many studies that suggest that even modest prison time operates as an effective deterrent on white collar defendants as a group.

And if you exclude sort of professional comment types, the recidivism rate for white collar defendants who have received even modest time, it is quite low.

So, one turns then to general deterrence. General deterrence, of course, when the crime is as large as this one, calls for substantial time. But I'm not sure there is any

magic in any given number of years. And in fact, again to talk about the studies, which are not very scientific at all, but nevertheless the studies suggest that there is no way to measure how much more general deterrence, if any, is achieved by adding two years or five years or 10 years to a prison term. A meaningful prison term is necessary to have general deterrence, but how much prison time is really largely a matter of guesswork, or of taking account of the other factors other than general deterrence into sentence.

So let me stop there. I've covered (B) and (C). Let me hear what the parties want to say about (B) and (C). I think here the government is bearing the burden on this, so we'll hear from the government first.

MS. MAGDO: I think, your Honor, we've touched upon deterrence already. In particular in talking about the recidivist risks of someone who has a serious mental health issue. And I do think that that mitigates in favor of a substantial sentence. I was not implying that there should be a prison term in order to remove temptations from gambling. It was a different point.

THE COURT: No, I misunderstood your point, but you clarified it.

MS. MAGDO: Okay.

THE COURT: Although, just the very image of a prison warden acting as a conservator was an image I won't likely

forget. When I'm in the mood for bad jokes, I will remember it. But, that was not your point.

MS. MAGDO: And your Honor, with respect to general deterrence, I think it goes back to the first part of Subsection two, which is the seriousness of the offense, and I can address that now or later, and just punishment.

We've spoken a lot about Mr. Caspersen. We haven't spoken very much about his victims yet. But, I do think that we have to — they are front and center here. I have met with all but one of them myself personally, and I've seen the impact that this has had on them. Even doubly worse is the fact that they didn't feel at liberty to tell the Court about that themselves.

So, I do think that in considering the need for deterrence, we should also think about the fact that this is not a victimless crime. This is not just a crime that benefited the defendant. It also really hurt other real people. So, that's pretty much all I'd like to say on that.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Shechtman.

MR. SHECHTMAN: I'll speak briefly as well, your Honor. I know those same deterrent studies that your Honor referred to, and they seem to tell us what Jeremy Bentham told us long ago, which is lent seems to be less important than the sentence itself, and the immediacy, and that that's what deters.

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But, I want to say one other thing, and that is one of the things that I think -

THE COURT: The only trouble is, half the people here won't know who Jeremy Bentham is. He didn't play for the Chicago Cubs, so why should they know.

MR. SHECHTMAN: They'll know. But, more seriously, it couldn't be a more serious afternoon. If you look in this audience, these are Andrew Caspersen's friends, classmates, not a single one of them knew that he was a compulsive gambler.

None of them. That's how well he hid it. None of them knew that he'd blown through 23 million of his own money or he was stealing from other people, including the good gentleman in the front row who he tried to steal from, or the gentleman in the second row that he did steal from.

And I say that because if you want deterrence, in large measure it comes from exposure and humiliation. And that's what's happened here. And it's happened in spades, it's happened to people who grew up with him, right, now know the illness, now know the suffering he inflicted on his wife, all of whom are as close to his wife as they are to him. And there was a time in this country when exposure was the punishment, right. I think today that exposure ought to give the Court a strong sense that there is deterrence here, because I don't think any of those people, they all were mortified, they all couldn't believe — one of them said I thought it must have

been April Fool's Day when I read this, and I looked at the headline again.

But they're all here today because they really do think this is mental illness, and I really think that exposure, that humiliation, is a way of guaranteeing the Court that a lengthy sentence isn't necessary to deter.

Specific, general deterrence, who knows. Government says in its brief that there is a public outcry that justifies a harsh sentence here. I'm not a great believer in public outcry. I would say this, without --

THE COURT: I'm not going to dwell on that, because I think that was only a passing remark by the government and really was not central to their argument. And you did respond to it.

MR. SHECHTMAN: I just --

THE COURT: But, just for the record, so to speak, the one thing no judge in imposing sentence should ever take account of is immediate public views. The public in the much broader sense, of course, is ultimately the boss. But immediate momentary public views should not be taken account of for two different reasons. One is, the people who are making an outcry, if they are, which I don't think was necessarily true in this case anyway, are acting on limited information. They don't have the benefit of what I have, and what counsel has, with all the things we've been discussing here today. And

it's very notable that many, many studies have shown that in many high profile cases, where the public as a whole was calling for a very high sentence, the jury that heard the evidence and found the defendant guilty, when polled, asked for a low, lenient sentence. And the difference was because the jury knew the facts. And the other reason is because the role of a judge is to apply the law to the facts and reach a reasoned conclusion.

While in a very ultimate sense my boss is the people of the United States, much what their direction or what the institution directs judges, the Constitution directs federal judges to do, is to do their best to apply reason to the legal and factual issues before them, and not to take account of anything else.

So, I probably went on too long on a matter that's really very secondary in any event. But, you don't have to be concerned about that.

MR. SHECHTMAN: Let me then next just make one last point. I take it the notion of general deterrence is were the public to see a sentence for Andrews that is not severe, someone would say to themselves, I can get away with a large theft. And it's hard for me to imagine that anyone would take that lesson from this case. I don't know that I can say this better than your Honor did about the fundamental precept of our legal system being to distinguish between people who make

rational choices and people who don't. But, this was not a rational choice, it was certainly one where capacity was diminished. And if there is somebody out will who says to themselves, I can steal, I can buy my island off of Nova Scotia and I can fool a judge, I reread your Carucci decision this morning. Goes back to 1999. And I remember the case because I think remnants of it were still at the U.S. attorney's office when I was, and if my memory is right, it's a massive scheme on the stock exchange fraud to trade ahead of customers. And it looked s like Mr. Carucci was a problem gambler. But, his cohorts came to him and said we have a great scheme, will you

And I guess if there's people out there who will say to themselves Andrew Caspersen got leniency and I can fool a judge into leniency, my response would be not this one, and not very many judges, if any, in this district that I've ever practiced in front of.

join. And he said count me in and he joined. And he stood in

court and said geez, I was a pathological gambler, and that's

why I traded ahead with my fellow workers.

THE COURT: All right. There is only one other provision of Subsection two, and that is (D), to provide the defendant with need educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.

While the bureau of prisons attempts to give medical

care as best it can, the kind of psychological care that would be called for here is provided, but not probably nearly in the most effective manner. But, I don't want to dwell on this because I think it is a very minor aspect of the sentence one way or the other.

The only other part of Section 3553(a) that I thought counsel might want to comment on, although you have both briefed this issue, is the disparity issue. The government argues that in other cases high sentences have been imposed. The defense argues that those cases are all very different from the case before the Court here.

I have very carefully considered both sides of that argument, but if there is anything further anyone wanted to say, this would be your opportunity. Anything further from the government on that issue?

MS. MAGDO: Not on that, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything from the defense?

MR. SHECHTMAN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: No. Before I hear from the defendant, if he wishes to be heard, let me hear any final statements that each counsel wants to make, starting again with the government.

MS. MAGDO: Your Honor, as we said earlier, we're not asking the Court to ignore or dismiss the mental health issues that the defendant had. But we do submit that they need to be seen in the entire context of what was going on here. And

there are two particularly salient factors that come to mind when we look at the whole context.

One, is what your Honor has already mentioned to some extent, the egregiousness of the crime. But what I'd like to focus on in particular is the effect of the victims, the non-financial effect on the victims. There are at least three such effects.

One is the fact the defendant committed this crime by stealing the identities of two people, one of those people was a friend of his, whom he had already defrauded, and he used his driver's license in an attempt to get another \$50 million investment in the month that he was arrested.

Second, the reputational harm to the victims who have not come forward. Many of these people, as I noted in my brief, are themselves investment professionals, and who have told me that when they know someone as well as they knew Mr. Caspersen, they make million or multimillion dollar deals with a handshake because of the level of trust that they have. And not only do they feel that that trust was abused and betrayed, but they are very afraid that they themselves will be publicly exposed and ridiculed for having had the naivete as people may judge them to have had to enter into this kind of an arrangement.

And third, is the employee at Park Hill Group that Mr. Caspersen dragged into this mess when one of the investors

wanted to have immediate redemption of his investment because he had become suspicious. Mr. Caspersen created a fake domain name, a fake e-mail address, he set up a telephone number, he impersonated someone on the phone, but apparently all of that not enough. So when the person asked to speak to someone else at Park Hill Group to verify that the redemption was underway, Mr. Caspersen turned — he was at this point a partner, and he turned to one of the employees and said please get on the line with this investor and tell them that their redemption is pending. So, to endanger the reputation and the profession of a junior employee in that way I think is also particularly egregious.

The second main factor is the fact that Mr. Caspersen was uniquely positioned to seek help for his addiction. We don't dispute that he had an addiction, but he had many opportunities, and he refused them. In particular, I'd like to focus on the events of late 2012 and early 2013, as we already have, when he conned two members of his family into giving him two and a quarter million dollars, proceeded to lose it in options trading, first tried to blame the brokerage house for losing the money. But apparently, because those kinds of thing just don't happen, he was forced to confess to those family members that he had lost their money in trading. So they very correctly told him he needed to get help, and he went to see a psychiatrist.

And he did not make the slightest effort to avail himself at that point. He had already been exposed as a fraudster. He had already harmed his family. He had already lost \$19 million of his and his family's money by that point. I think it's pretty clear that that's a very bad situation to find yourself in. And what did he do when he went to the therapist? He lied, he failed to take the therapist's advice, he went for seven 45-minute sessions and then stopped going.

He called six months later to get a refill on a prescription. The psychiatrist told him you should continue therapy, I'm not going to prescribe any medication to you until you do, and he never went back.

It's that behavior that we're asking the Court to hold the defendant accountable for. He had the resources, the means, the intelligence, and the family support, that very few addicts have. His family, his wife has stood by him even in light of what's happened in 2016. There is no reason to think she wouldn't have stood by him in 2012, if he had enlisted her help. All the things that he's been doing since March, since his arrest, inpatient psychiatric treatment, twice a week individual counseling, attending GA meetings, enlisting the support of his family. Those things have worked. He hasn't gambled since then. He hasn't had a drink since then. And there is no reason to think those things would not have worked if he had made an effort earlier on.

He had a chance. He had a moment of intervention by outside forces. And he completely refused to do anything. In the words of the psychiatrist who has been treating him since March, he didn't even try. And there has to be some

Like Carucci that the defendant just cited, your Honor pointed out that in that case, the defendant did not engage in anything like a Dostoevskian struggle to rid himself of his addiction.

THE COURT: I remember that guy. He was a contemporary of Jeremy Bentham.

accountability for that failure.

MS. MAGDO: And similarly, here, there was no struggle, Dostoevskian or otherwise, there was not even a meaningful effort.

For all the addicts who have struggled and who have been in and out of treatment, who have made real efforts, and yet cannot overcome their addiction, there has to be justice for someone who had the means, the support, the resources, the education, to know that he needed to get help. And refused.

THE COURT: Thank you. Let me hear from defense counsel.

MR. SHECHTMAN: Judge, I will not speak at length, but I hope what I say will help the Court and Mr. Caspersen.

In another courtroom I would begin by telling the judge that the sentencing guidelines are a failure and should

not be our guide today. Your Honor, however, knows that quite well. Sentencing is a time for moral judgment, and a grid cannot capture the complexity of a life.

In another courtroom, I might discuss the neuroscience literature on pathological gambling. Dr. Potenza has done that today. Suffice it to say we know far more today than we did 10 years ago, and we'll know far more in 10 years than we know today.

But what is beyond dispute is that pathological gambling is a mental illness. That does not mean that Mr. Caspersen's actions were involuntary. It does not excuse his actions. Stealing \$38.5 million from family and friends is inexcusable. But his illness should affect how one assesses his culpability, and should affect it for the reasons that your Honor said earlier.

If there is any doubt that these crimes arose from mental illness, I remind you of these undisputed facts. Andrew Caspersen lost \$23 million of his own money betting options. Andrew Caspersen's trading, his coin flips were doomed to failure. Mr. Rosen, the options expert, writes they were a recipe for inevitably losing everything. Again, in Mr. Rosen's words, only an irrational state, only a person in an irrational state would embark on and would remain on the path Mr. Caspersen pursued.

Your Honor referred to those trades earlier as high

risk. And respectfully, I don't think that's the right characterization. If you stand here and flip a coin, and each time you win you double that bet, heads, heads, heads, that coin's going to come up tails at some point, and you're going to lose everything. That's what Andrew Caspersen's bets were. And the crazy thing is, he knew it. He once showed his father that it didn't seem like the greatest strategy, and he pursued it, 2007, 2008, all the way until his arrest.

Mr. Caspersen may be angry at me for doing this, because it's a story that he told me that he heard in that church basement. But there is a fellow who owned a store and the store had a slot machine in it, and it was rigged. And the fellow was a pathological gambler. The store owner. And he played his own slot machine knowing it was rigged, because that was the action. Pulling that machine. And that was the action here, flipping that coin. Heads, the stock market's going to go down, heads it's going to go down. And eventually at the end of February of this year, it went up.

So, as I say, respectfully, this isn't high risk. This trading pattern bordered on madness.

A graduate of Princeton and Harvard Law School, Andrew Caspersen spent much of his waking hours staring at and even recording the ticks of the S&P index.

Another story he won't be happy with me telling, but I have this feeling if I walk out of this courtroom and if I

don't say everything, that I know I'll be disserving the judge.

This is a fellow who went with his wife to see

Hamilton, and he spent Hamilton looking at his cell phone to

look at the S&P index so that the people behind him said what's

your problem, sir. And you know what his problem was, I know

what his problem was. And I joked with Ms. Lynaugh there are

10 criteria in the DSM index. I can give you one. If you

can't watch Hamilton without looking at the S&P index, that's a

serious mental illness.

What else do we know. We know that his trading records for 2012 spanned 440 pages, and that's roughly true for most of these years. We also know that when he stole for the first time in November of 2014, he had a \$4 million bonus coming in 19 days, and he couldn't wait 19 days, he couldn't go 19 days without trading.

And of course, as your Honor said, he had \$112 million in his trading account on February 11 of this year, 126 intraday. And he placed a \$103 million bet the next morning, everything in on a bet that the market would go down. And if you look at those trading records, that bet was placed at 9:31 that morning. The broker who tolerated all this, the broker said to him I should spread the trades over the course of the day, \$103 million in the option market is a big trade. And the answer was see if you can get it done by 10 o'clock. And he did. And so he went from 126 million up to betting 103 and

quickly down to almost nothing.

What else do we know? We know that the commissions in January alone were \$444,000. This was a very expensive casino indeed.

So, it's not a disputed topic today and maybe I've spent too much time on it. But this was indeed a severe gambling disorder.

When I think of Andrew Caspersen, I think of -- and I've said this in what I've submitted to the Court, Alexei Ivanovich, Dostoyevsky's gambler, who said even as I approach the gambling hall, as soon as I am two rooms away, I almost go into convulsions.

Andrew Caspersen was Dostoevsky's gambler. Whether it was to relieve the pressure, whether it was the thrill of being in the action, what mattered and only mattered in the last few years was being in the action.

Like all compulsive gamblers, like the one I spoke about who had the slot machine in his store, Andrew Caspersen believed that his wrongs were temporary, and would be conquered by persistent betting. He suffered what's been called a gambler's fallacy, a win was sure to follow from a streak of losses. Studies show if you ask a pathological gambler if there is skill involved in playing a slot machine, he will tell you it is equal chance and skill. A compulsive gambler believes he's in control when he's out of control. And that,

too, is Andrew Caspersen. No matter how many times he lost everything, he was convinced he would win it all back.

These were friends, these were relatives, that he did not intend to harm, because he thought he would win. And that was madness again, because he was destined to lose and he hurt people who were very close to him.

He seemed to never understand with these trades, as they say, what goes up must come down. And that's true of the stock market.

If you read the letters from Andrew's friends, you find a constant theme. Andrew was the adult in the room, he was everyone's role model, everyone's moral compass. By November 2014 when he started stealing from his friends, his moral compass was broken. He was no longer pointing straight. He needed to be all in every day.

Judge, I'm new to pathological gambling. This is my second case. I've tried to read as much of the literature as I could. What I'm more familiar with is a not unrelated illness, anorexia. As you know, too many young women, and it seems to be women in our country, and often the brightest, are afflicted with the disorder. It is an epidemic. And like pathological gambling, it causes people to act irrationally. Telling an anorexic to eat is like telling a compulsive gambler to stop betting. Were it so easy. Like pathological gambling, anorexia often kills. Part of the motto of Gamblers Anonymous

is this: Many pursue it into the gates of prison, insanity, or death. The two disorders are akin in this way as well.

Neither is a moral failing. We'll learn more about both in the next decade. But what we know should teach us not to judge those who are afflicted too harshly.

A European essayist has written these words: The test of one's humanity is whether one is able to accept this fact not as lip service, but with the shuttering recognition of kinship. There but for the grace of God go I.

Why was Andrew Caspersen afflicted? I don't know. Dr. Potenza doesn't know. Dr. Goodman doesn't know. In our lifetime we'll probably never know. But afflicted he surely was.

When Andrew Caspersen first came to see me after his hospitalization, my office was close to his Park Hill office where he worked. He came with his hat pulled over his eyes. He was afraid he would bump into a colleague on the street, and he feared their disapproving looks. He was deeply ashamed. He remains ashamed, but he's now met with several of the victims, and their lawyers, and tried to explain his conduct to them. He has cried and asked for their forgiveness.

Because of GA, Dr. Goldman, his wife, and his many friends, Andrew holds his head up higher now and doesn't hide his face.

He has lost his career, the SEC has barred him from

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the securities industry, and he has lost much more. But slowly, he's regained his self worth, and I truly believe that slowly he has regained his good judgment.

In a word, Andrew Caspersen is not the same man who was arraigned in this building seven months ago and then rushed to a suicide watch. He has stopped gambling, he has stopped drinking, he has attended GA and AA regularly, his sponsors are here today to support him as they have this past seven months.

They know in 2016 no drug, no elixir exists to treat pathological gambling. The treatment that may work best is GA. And I've said it before today, men and women coming together, often in a church basement, to share and reinforce their commitment to sobriety.

Andrew has also seen an experienced therapist regularly, and benefited greatly from their relationship. As Dr. Goldman writes, he's been through therapy honestly and seriously. With therapy comes insight, and Andrew has gained valuable insight.

He's also reconciled with his mother and his wife. Their anger towards him has been replaced with their pleas for leniency. And Andrew is now the doting father of two young children, who had lost his full attention when his attention was rivetted on the S&P index.

Judge, you've always recognized that even when the guidelines were their most procrustean, that sentencing is a

day of moral reckoning which takes into account all aspects of crime and the offender. Andrew Caspersen is an uncommonly good man who lost his way. I know you will judge him fairly.

I thank the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. Now let's hear from the defendant, if he wishes to be heard.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I've committed serious crimes and frauds. I have no one to blame but myself. My victims include lifelong friends, former colleagues, my former employer, my mother, my brother, and my wife. All of these people had one thing in common. They trusted me. And I abused that trust in immoral and illegal ways so that I could gamble. I lost their money, I abused their friendships, I destroyed my family's name. I humiliated my wife, and I subjected my children to the future knowledge that I did all of this.

There has been a lot of talk about compulsive gambling today. While it explains what I did, I know in no way does it excuse it, and it certainly does not take away any of the financial or emotional devastation I brought to my victims.

It is, I learned, a cautionary lesson for a compulsive gambler watching this hearing, what path to take before you get to the stage where victims are defrauded. The first path is what I did for almost 20 years. I chose gambling over everything. Over everything I loved and treasured. I chose it over my morals, my conscience, my relationships, my family, my

career, my wife, my children, and eventually the law. I was willing to do anything to continue, and eventually I did.

The second path that a compulsive gambler could take is what I've tried to take since my arrest. It's involved psychotherapy, honesty, most importantly Gamblers Anonymous. Yes, this path I took after I was arrested, after I was publicly humiliated, that's what — that's what it took for me. I wasn't willing to seriously stop in 2012 or 2013 or 2001. It wasn't until outside forces intervened and put me in jail, and then put me in the psychiatric ward, that I realized enough was enough, and I couldn't continue down this path.

The only thing worse than committing all these frauds against all these people I loved would be not to learn from it and actually go out and gamble and drink again.

I stand before you asking for mercy. I don't know what the right sentence is for what I did, but I do know for the rest of my life, regardless of this sentence, I will be making amends.

As for the risk of relapse, it's always possible for an addict. The numbers are not great. But I do know in the program that I've participated in, many times a week, the people who go through the steps and the people who attend succeed. It is, the big book says, rarely has someone who's followed our steps thoroughly failed. I intend to follow those steps thoroughly one day at a time. I am finally on the right

path.

I am terribly sorry. I could not be more sorry that it took the devastation that I brought upon these victims to get to this right path. I'm not going to waste the opportunity now that I am. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. So, a point that this Court has made before, and that Mr. Shechtman also picked up on, is that a sentence more than anything else is a moral judgment.

Among my many other problems with the guidelines, putting aside their irrationality, putting aside their draconian far too punitive approach to all crimes, not just white collar crimes, putting aside their very real responsibility for the portion of the mass incarceration of which this country should be so ashamed, is the fact that they regard sentencing as an exercise in bean counting, as opposed to one of the most difficult tasks that those fallible human beings we call judges have to undertake, which is a moral judgment on a fellow human being.

But, Congress, in its wisdom in enacting Section 3553, has very clearly recognized the moral judgments involved, because they put first and foremost that the Court must focus on the nature and circumstances of the offense, in this case egregious, and history and characteristics of the defendant, in this case impaired. And they direct how the Court is to

resolve that tension. And also to take account of the somewhat more abstract, but still very fundamental purposes, of sentencing such as deterrence, just punishment, and the like.

By decreeing that the Court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with these various purposes, that's an expression of a moral judgment, too. That's an expression of the notion that even in this cruel world where people commit, as the defendant has here, terrible offenses, the punishment of prison is not one that can ever be justified beyond the purposes that Congress has specified. It can never be an act of revenge, it can never be an act of gratuitous expression of outrage. Life is too precious to permit that kind of sentence.

So how does one apply all that to this case. The guideline range of 15 years or so is absurd. The probation officer, sort of cutting the baby in half, recommends a sentence of about seven and a half years. And there is a certain rough justice to that for, as the government points out, one cannot overlook not just the size of the fraud, but also the real impact on victims of the fraud. And the fact that the crime was committed by a person who had so many benefits, so many gifts, so many opportunities to say I'll stop and did not.

But, having said all that, in addition to his very real gambling disorder, which I am quite convinced very

seriously impacted his exercise of rational control and rational decision making, there is also the fact that no purpose will be served by letting him rot in prison for years on end. It will serve no purpose that the Court can justify.

The conclusion is that there must be a serious prison sentence here, but not the kind that the guidelines suggest.

The sentence of the Court, therefore, is that the defendant is sentenced to four years in prison -- 48 months -- to be followed by three years of supervised release on terms that I'll get to in a moment. Restitution will be ordered in the amount of \$27,831,791.06.

This is without prejudice, of course, to the claims that Mrs. Caspersen has made which I will resolve in a separate order.

And there is also a mandatory special assessment of \$200.

By the way, the sentence is concurrent on all counts, on both counts.

The terms of supervised release are: First, the mandatory conditions that the defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local crime; that the defendant shall not illegally possess a controlled substance; that the defendant shall not possess a firearm or destructive device; that the defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA.

But the one other mandatory condition, the mandatory

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drug condition is suspended because I will impose instead a special condition requiring both drug testing and alcohol and drug -- excuse me, both alcohol and mental health treatment.

There will also be imposed the standard conditions of supervision one through 13, they appear on the face of the judgment, and will be gone over with the defendant by the probation officer when he reports to begin his period of supervised release.

And then there are the special conditions: First, that the defendant shall participate in a mental health treatment program approved by the probation office, on the standard terms and conditions. Second, that the defendant will participate in an alcohol treatment program as prescribed by the probation officer on the standard terms and conditions. Third, that the defendant shall provide the probation officer with access to any requested financial information. Particularly, well, any requested information financial information, including trading information. Fourth, that the defendant shall not incur new credit charges, open additional lines of credit, or open securities trading accounts without the approval of the probation officer, unless the defendant is in compliance with the installment payment schedule. Fifth, that the defendant shall pay 20 percent of his gross monthly income towards the restitution requirement beginning 30 days after his beginning of his supervised release. Sixth, that the

defendant will report to the nearest probation office within 72 hours of his release from prison, and he will be supervised by the district of his residence.

I will enter a separate order specifying the more particularized terms of the restitution. And there is a forfeiture to which the defendant has previously agreed.

So, before I advise the defendant of his right of appeal, and we set a surrender date, is there anything else that either counsel needs to raise with the Court?

Yes, ma'am.

MS. MAGDO: Your Honor, with respect to the restitution, the government would respectfully ask the Court to hold off on making a restitution order. Even in the PSR, it's noted that there are some shifting amounts. One victim is paying back another victim. There may be additional fees that certain victims are entitled to. Therefore, we would request an additional 90 days --

THE COURT: That's fine. But am I right that that doesn't really change the 27 million total, it just affects the allocation?

MS. MAGDO: Actually, it does. The amount that the defendant agreed to was a minimum of 36 million and change.

And that's just the direct loss to the victims. In addition, certain victims may be entitled to attorneys' fees in connection with their participation in the criminal

investigation.

THE COURT: I hear you. So, but sooner than in 90 days you need to make a submission, and if there is any disagreement about it, then the defense will make a submission also in less than 90 days, so I can comply with the 90-day limit that the law sets.

MS. MAGDO: Yes.

THE COURT: I will hold off on restitution until that is determined. Anything else?

MS. MAGDO: No, thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything further from the defense?

MR. SHECHTMAN: Judge, I don't know what your practice is in terms of recommending an institution.

THE COURT: I'm happy to recommend, but it is, as you know in this day and age, those recommendations are often not followed by the bureau of prisons. But I have no problem recommending. Where do you want me to recommend?

MR. SHECHTMAN: That's the question. I don't know if your Honor would allow us until Monday just to think about that. Otisville is the best for visitation, but there are not very many beds at the inn.

THE COURT: That's fine. Why don't you submit something in writing on Monday. If the government has any problems with it, they can submit something on Tuesday and then I'll hold off entering the judgment until Wednesday.

1 MR. SHECHTMAN: That's great. Thank you, Judge. THE COURT: In terms of a surrender date. Let me ask 2 3 my courtroom deputy what she has in mind. 4 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Like Wednesday, January 4? 5 THE COURT: January 4. That's good because that's 6 after the holidays. Any problem with that? 7 MR. SHECHTMAN: No, your Honor. MS. MAGDO: No, your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: 2 p.m. at the designated institution on 10 January 4, 2017. 11 Before I advise the defendant of his right of appeal, 12 anything else from defense? 13 MR. SHECHTMAN: Nothing, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Mr. Caspersen, you have the right to 15 appeal this sentence. Do you understand that if you can't afford counsel for the appeal, the Court will appoint one free 16 of charge? Do you understand that? 17 18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 19 THE COURT: Very good. Thanks very much. The Court 20 will adjourn. There is another matter that counsel are aware 21 of that we'll take up in 10 or 15 minutes. 22 MS. MAGDO: Thank you, your Honor. 23 000 24